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Abstract 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a rapidly evolving technology. While 
industrialists hope that the use of RFID will bring about great benefits, civil rights 
activists warn against the dangers. Since RFID pervades everyday life more and 
more, this paper deals with its potential impact on individuals. Currently private 
persons are least included in the public debate, although perhaps they will be 
affected the most by potential negative effects. 
Critics are especially concerned about the potential violation of privacy. Due to its 
informational infrastructure RFID could be used for surveillance purposes. Many 
people therefore fear a surveillance state. Looking at the use of RFID on the prod-
uct level, completely dynamic pricing and business models could be developed. If 
everyday objects record and send context sensitive information via embedded RFID 
tags, this might strongly influence our perception of these objects and our emo-
tional attitude towards them. This relationship between man and RFID containing 
smart objects is expected to differ from the relationship between man and ma-
chines as well as man and computers, as a new function as well as a new signifi-
cance are added to already well-known objects. 
Last but not least, this paper also points out RFID's potential impact on health and 
environment, which has barely been discussed in public so far. 
The analysis shows that, apart from certain opportunities, considerable risks have 
to be dealt with. However, panic, as suggested by some critics, seems unreason-
able as the development is still wide open. This should rather be considered a great 
chance: it offers the possibility to play an active role in the shaping of RFID within 
a legal democratic process. In this process all members of society are likewise 
responsible for future developments. 
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1 Introduction 
Today Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) is a rapidly evolving technology 
and at the same time it is strongly 
disputed among experts. Some com-
panies already use RFID while others 
plan its implementation in the near 
future (SOREON 2004). Enormous 
progress is predicted for the miniaturi-
sation of chips, by lower costs, an 
increase of storage capacity and devel-
opments in materials sciences (Mat-
tern 2003: 11). Thus, numerous inno-
vative applications of RFID will be-
come possible. Even today industry is 
highly committed to this technology, 
because it reckons with more efficient 
processing conditions in the long run.1 
Yet civil rights activists draw the atten-
tion to the risks of RFID concerning 
data protection and privacy.2 Some 
even draw the attention to a possible 
fall of the democratic constitutional 
state regarding RFID (Brust 2004). 
Specifically alarming is the fact that 
the general public – especially in 
Germany – hardly knows anything 
about RFID (Capgemini 2005), while it 
pervades everyday life, continually and 
unnoticed by many people. 
This paper wants to present a survey of 
some potential effects of RFID on 
everyday life with a special focus on 
questions and consequences from the 
individual's point of view. Further-
more, the different positions in the 
debate will be discussed as well as the 
question of accountability concerning 
the development of this technology. 
 
                                                       
1 One of the most important publications in 
this field is the RFID-Journal. It presents a 
survey of the latest technological develop-
ments and pilot projects, 
www.rfidjournal.com [as at 28.12.2005]. 
2 Among the main critics are, for example, 
Katherine Albrecht, chairperson of the 
Organisation CASPIAN (USA), 
www.spychips.org [as at 28.12.2005], Rena 
Tangens and padeluun, chairperson of 
FoeBud e.V. (Germany), www.foebud.org/ 
rfid [as at 28.12.2005]. 
2 RFID: technological basis and 
examples of usage 
2.1 Technological basis 
RFID technology is an automated 
identification technology. By means of 
RFID objects, animals or persons can 
be clearly identified over a certain 
distance. RFID systems always consist 
of two components: a transponder and 
a reader. The reader consists of a 
reading and possibly a writing unit3 
and an antenna. It transmits energy to 
the transponder, scans its data and 
possibly makes the transponder store 
additional data. A transponder only 
sends data if it is near a corresponding 
reader ("on call"). The transponder, 
also called 'tag', is the actual data 
carrier, consisting of an antenna and a 
chip. On this chip a unique identifica-
tion number is stored. Between 16 and 
64 kb of additional data can be stored, 
depending on the kind of transponder 
(Finkenzeller 2002: 8). 
RFID tags exist in different sizes and 
shapes: as self-adhesive labels (so-
called smart labels), as glass cylinder 
transponders, as plastic transponders, 
as watches, keychain pendants, or as 
plastic cards (so-called smart cards). 
There are numerous other types which 
can be adjusted according to usage 
(Finkenzeller 2002: 14-22). The for-
gery-proof nature of RFID tags is 
commonly considered as very high 
(Finkenzeller 2002: 8; Oertel et al. 
2004: 90). RFID systems differ on 
frequency bands, transmission ranges, 
storing technologies, security systems4 
and means of power supply. All these 
factors together constitute the quali-
ties of the system. Therefore one 
cannot speak of the RFID system. 
Transmission ranges often appear to 
                                                       
3 Not every RFID system contains a writing 
unit, because not all kinds of transponders 
are rewritable and allow the storage of 
additional data on top of an unique identi-
fication number. 
4 There are different procedures for authen-
tification and codification available. 
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be unclear. In exceptional cases a 
transmission range of up to one kilo-
metre can be reached. However, the 
systems that are used in Europe only 
reach a few centimetres – because of 
legal restrictions on the one hand and 
the development status on the other 
hand – smart labels for instance which 
are applied to the product level, or 1.2 
to 4 metres for applications in the 
logistics branch (RF-ID 2004; IDTe-
chEx 2004; Oertel et al. 2004: 29).5 
RFID systems still have technical 
deficiencies. Among them are 
• the high costs, 
• the low degree of standardisation 
concerning the compatibility of 
products from different manufac-
turers or of different frequency 
ranges,6 
• gaps in the security systems used,7 
• performance problems in the vicin-
ity of metal and certain liquids 
                                                       
5 The technical information of this chapter 
largely follows Klaus Finkenzeller`s "RFID-
Handbuch" (2002), which I would like to 
recommend for further technical details. 
6 The use of multiple frequency readers 
could be a big step forward. One of the first 
of its kind was presented at the end of 
2005, cf.                                                        
http://ubiks.net/local/blog/jmt/archives3/00
4561.html [as at 28.12.2005] 
7 These are discussed in detail in the essay 
on "Risiken und Chancen des Einsatzes von 
RFID-Systemen", published by the Bundes-
amt für Sicherheit in der Informationstech-
nik (Oertel et al. 2004: 41-65). 
• as well as a lack of globally stan-
dardised regulations for radio fre-
quencies. 
All these problems have hindered 
global usage so far (Oertel et al. 2004: 
101-111). 
However, experts believe that the 
present technical problems will be 
largely overcome by 2010 (Oertel et al. 
2004: 106) and they expect a further 
exponential increase in performance, 
according to Moore's law (Moore 
1965).8 For the European market a 
strong growth of the RFID sector has 
been predicted for the following years 
(SOREON 2004; Oertel et al. 2004: 104-
111). Germany is even expected to 
become market leader by the year 
2008 (SOREON 2004). 
2.2 Examples of usage 
In the following paragraph a few 
examples of today's usage will be 
presented to show how RFID works 
and can be used, also to start reflec-
tions on potential future usage. They 
are just examples, because the tech-
                                                       
8 In summary Moore`s law from 1965 says 
that a computer`s CPU capacity will 
roughly double every 18 months. So far 
this prediction has also been confirmed in 
the field of storage capacity and communi-
cation range. Simultaneously prices for 
microelectronic components will fall 
radically while the CPU capacity remains 
the same. These facts facilitate a wide-
spread use of a technology. 
Chart 1- Basic components of an RFID system 
(based on: Finkenzeller 2002: 7) 
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nology is rapidly evolving at present; 
consequently the number of pilot 
projects and new applications is con-
stantly increasing. 
Identification of animals, objects and 
people 
The identification of animals belongs 
to one of the traditional applications of 
RFID. Especially cattle, sheep and 
goats are tagged with electronic ear 
chips or implanted transponders. If an 
animal passes a reader, it can be 
clearly identified and additional data 
on origin, diseases, sex and previous 
whereabouts can be read. According to 
a regulation by the EU all goat and 
sheep populations from a certain size 
are to be electronically tagged and all 
the data is to be stored in a central 
database by 2008 (Press releases 
2003). 
Similarly RFID is already being used 
for the identification of containers in 
transportation, of garbage containers 
and for the unique identification of 
products (Oertel et al. 2004: 67). 
Gradually, it is also used to identify 
people. In Japan RFID is used for the 
surveillance of school children, for 
example (Heise 2004). In a pilot project 
of the New York Jacobi Medical Center 
patients are kept under surveillance 
with an RFID wrist band. This applica-
tion also enables hospital staff to 
access medical records directly on the 
patient (Fiutak 2004). 
Protection against counterfeiting of 
documents 
Since the end of 2005 Germany just 
like other countries has started intro-
ducing passports containing biometric 
data such as fingerprints. They are 
encoded in an RFID tag and when 
passports are controlled they can be 
scanned and compared with the fea-
tures of the passport holder. This is 
supposed to increase the forgery-proof 
nature of the document (Die Welt 
2004). The implementation of RFID in 
banknotes is also being discussed 
(Hascher 2003; Krempl 2004). 
Protection against theft 
Retail has already been using 1-bit 
transponders for the last 40 years. 
Transponders are attached to products 
and readers are installed in security 
gates near the exit. When a product is 
bought, the transponder is removed or 
re-set to "0".9 The security gates can be 
passed with paid-for products, but a 
stolen article sets off an alarm. Librar-
ies or electronic immobilisers make 
use of RFID in a similar way (Oertel et 
al. 2004: 81-82). 
Access control 
RFID has already been firmly estab-
lished in the field of access control. 
Many companies use transponders in 
the form of cards or keychain pendants 
as electronic identification to control 
building access and record the work-
ing hours. In many holiday regions 
transponders replace hotel keys, ski 
passes or local credit cards. They also 
play a growing part in the sale of 
tickets for public transport or cultural 
events (Oertel et al. 2004: 76-80). Since 
the beginning of 2004 the Baja Beach 
Club in Barcelona, Spain, has offered 
guests a small, implantable glass 
cylinder chip to identify them. They in 
turn use it to pay for food and drinks 
(Gossett 2004). 
Tracking and tracing 
RFID is used more and more to track 
baggage and parcels, and for toll 
collection (Oertel et al. 2004: 76-80). 
However, from the industry's point of 
view the supply chain management is 
considered most important. The pro-
duction and distribution of goods 
requires complex partner networks. 
RFID tags on the product mean that it 
can be individually tracked in real time 
as it moves from location to location. 
The supply chain management be-
comes transparent and can be organ-
                                                       
9 Which is not to be confused with "turned 
off" as the tags technically cannot be 
turned off in a reliable and safe manner, 
yet. 
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ised more efficiently in the future due 
to increasing automation. Today 
mainly car industries use this technol-
ogy during the production process. In 
preliminary pilot projects it is also 
tested to track products until they are 
in the consumer's hands, for example 
in the Metro-Future-Store in Rhein-
berg, Germany (Oertel et al. 2004: 84-
89).10 
 
3 Potential impact of RFID on 
everyday life 
All participants of the discussion seem 
to agree that huge changes will be 
brought about by new RFID applica-
tions. However, the quality of these 
changes and their intensity are widely 
disputed. In the following chapter 
some potential effects will be de-
scribed. 
3.1 Protection of the private sphere 
Critics regard the invasion of privacy 
as one of the most crucial potential 
effects (Aspekte 2005; CASPIAN et al. 
2005; Oertel et al. 2004: 110). Discuss-
ing this issue it is necessary to under-
stand what the term private sphere 
means and why it is considered to be 
indispensable in a free democratic 
system. More over, it is equally neces-
sary to establish criteria for the protec-
tion of privacy. 
Description and value of the private 
sphere 
The discussion about the effects of 
RFID applications is based on Beate 
Rössler's definition of privacy (2001; 
2003). The term informational privacy 
refers to all data about a person, in 
general everything other people know 
about a person (Rössler 2003: 17). 
Informational privacy especially in-
cludes individual-related data. 
                                                       
10 More information on this project can be 
found online at www.future-store.org.[as at 
06.11.2005] 
In 1995 the European Union (EU) laid 
down a privacy policy which also says 
that the term individual-related refers 
to those data of a person which can 
directly or indirectly be used to clearly 
identify a person (Europäisches Parla-
ment 1995). 
Gary T. Marx offers a different ap-
proach by defining certain limits of 
privacy (Marx quoted by Bohn et al. 
2003: 205-206): 
• "natural limits" refer to the physical 
limits of observability; 
• "social limits" refer to the basic 
confidence that social groups have 
in other people's attitude towards 
private data; 
• "physical or temporal limits" refer 
to the fact that different areas of life 
can exist in isolation without influ-
encing each other; 
• "situational limits" refer to the fact 
that what is said or done unthink-
ingly may be forgotten after some 
time. 
Accordingly a person's privacy is 
violated if one of these limits is 
crossed. 
The protection of the private sphere is 
valuable, because it protects the indi-
vidual's liberty and autonomy (Rössler 
2003: 18). The protection of privacy is 
therefore founded on everyone's right 
to lead a free and autonomous life. 
This statement is also reflected in the 
argumentation of the Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht (German Constitutional 
Court) concerning the so-called Cen-
sus Verdict. The term "informationelle 
Selbstbestimmung" (control over one's 
personal data) and its value are ex-
pressed most clearly here: 
"If somebody cannot overlook with 
sufficient certainty which information 
concerning certain areas is known to 
his social environment (…) he can be 
significantly hindered from planning 
and deciding in a self-determined way. 
(…) If somebody has to reckon with the 
registration of his participation in a 
meeting or a citizens' initiative by the 
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authorities and with the danger that 
risks for him are involved, he will 
perhaps not exercise his corresponding 
basic rights (German Constitutional 
Law, Article 8, Paragraph 9)." (Krisch 
2005: 9) 
Therefore the control over one's per-
sonal data is a basic principle of the 
free democratic constitutional state. It 
is as important for the individual's 
chances for development according to 
the German Constitution as for the free 
democratic state which is based on the 
active participation of its citizens 
(Krisch 2005: 9). 
Criteria for the protection of the private 
sphere 
From the explanations above criteria 
for the protection of informational 
privacy and the use of personal data 
can be deduced. They were summa-
rised and are internationally known as 
the "Principles of Fair Information 
Practice" (CASPIAN et al. 2003; OECD 
2003). In principle personal data shall 
only be collected in a range as limited 
as possible, only if highly necessary 
and they shall only be used for fixed 
purposes ("collection limitation and 
purpose specification"). Personal data 
shall remain concealed as far as possi-
ble and only be passed on or published 
in a limited and selective way ("ano-
nymity and pseudonymity"). It must be 
guaranteed that unauthorised persons 
do not have access to data which has 
been collected ("confidentiality"). 
Individuals have the right to know 
when and under which circumstances 
data is collected. This can be guaran-
teed by an obligation to obtain ap-
proval for example. Later on data 
subjects shall have access to their data 
as well as the possibility to correct or 
delete it and to object to its use 
("transparency and access"). This 
means that the operators of RFID 
systems must be considered reliable in 
so far as they need to show a serious 
interest in keeping the data up-to-
date, as well as complete and correct. 
They are also obliged to use only the 
amount of data agreed upon for the 
specific purpose agreed upon. There 
must be an entity to which individuals 
can complain in case of conflict ("con-
fidence and security"). 
Example: RFID at retail 
Many publications focus on the use of 
RFID at retail trade. The reason is 
perhaps that some companies plan on 
introducing RFID in the near future or 
they already test it (SOREON 2004). 
RFID in conjunction with the so-called 
Electronic Product Code (EPC) will be 
used for the globally unique identifica-
tion and tracking of items from pro-
duction to disposal (Krisch 2005: 4).11 
Apart from product-specific data, 
further information about the context 
of the product can be stored. The 
following paragraphs are to be under-
stood as a demonstration of potential 
using possibilities. 
The EPC system of tags in connection 
with so-called smart shelves, i.e. 
shelves equipped with readers, can 
record the shopping behaviour of a 
costumer without being noticed. In 
conjunction with the use of a 
personalised loyalty card, a credit card 
or surveillance cameras the data 
collected can be unmistakably be tied 
to the identity of this person. Classic 
"data mining"12 methods allow the 
construction of detailed consumer 
profiles afterwards. It may contain 
information about a customer's habits, 
his potential spending capacity and his 
social environment. This information 
can be directly used for individual 
pricing as well as advertising 
measures.13 
                                                       
11Further information:                                    
www.epcglobalinc.org (6.11.2005) 
12 "Data mining" describes the systematic 
detection and extraction of unknown 
information, mostly automatic or semi-
automatic, from a great amount of data, to 
analyse among other things a consumer's 
shopping behaviour and to develop tar-
geted marketing strategies (Wikipedia 
2005). 
13 This is demonstrated for example by a 
virtual tour through the Metro Future 
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As the tags remain functional after the 
products have been bought, they can 
be scanned by every reader which is 
equipped according to the same stan-
dards. As a result, without knowledge 
(or consent) someone can be identified 
via the products carried along. If a 
combination of data concerning place, 
time and identity of a person is auto-
matically stored in a backend data-
base, a person’s movement from 
location to location can be retraced. 
Moreover it is possible that alongside 
the global EPC network, more data-
bases are set up by the operators for 
their own individual purposes. In 
general, this means: The more readers 
are installed in public space, the more 
detailed an individual can be profiled 
and tracked. 
Potential restrictions on the private 
sphere 
The example mentioned above shows 
that the afore-mentioned criteria 
which should guarantee the protection 
of the private sphere and the "Princi-
ples of Fair Information Practice" can 
all be easily violated. 
The reason for this is mainly the 
technology's "invisibility", as the scan-
ning and storing of data can go unno-
ticed by the person concerned. The 
readers can be placed invisibly. Tags 
can be incorporated into the packaging 
material or embedded in a way that 
goes unseen to the naked eye. Data 
transmission needs neither direct 
contact nor is it restricted to intervisi-
bility, therefore it is virtually impossi-
ble for people to know when or where 
the reading process takes place and 
they are being identified.14 Additionally 
                                                                 
Store, where the use of RFID is tested in a 
pilot project. Metro Future Store Initiative: 
www.future-store.org/multimedia/virtual 
tour mpeg1.zip. (10.4.2005) 
14 In comparison, if a barcode system is in 
use the customer will always know be-
cause a contact between barcode and 
scanner is necessary to read the code. 
Besides, the barcode only contains the 
name of the product (e.g. Philadelphia 
the example of the Metro scandal at 
the beginning of 2004 shows that the 
use of RFID is not always disclosed to 
customers (FoeBuD 2004).15 Hereby 
the criteria of reliability and security 
are also violated, as individuals cannot 
have confidence in unknown data 
processors and they cannot exercise 
their right to be informed about their 
data, to correct or cancel them, if they 
do not know who they are (cf. Krisch 
2005: 15). Data processing is not 
transparent to private persons – this 
contributes to the "invisibility" of the 
technology. According to Krisch, the 
data collected can also be linked and 
retrieved without a directly known 
name. Thus the persons concerned do 
not have the opportunity to be in-
formed about the storage of their data 
and check it, because they would have 
to know the product specificcodes. Yet 
this is impossible without special 
technical equipment (cf. Krisch 2005: 
13). 
Now and again cases are uncovered 
where the security systems of RFID 
operators fail when data is transmitted 
or stored in a backend machine. These 
cases can result in data abuse (Rentrop 
2005). Yet experts believe that privacy 
is less put at risk by attacks on the 
RFID system, than by its normal opera-
tions (Oertel et al. 2004: 55). 
Existing protection measures 
The fact that RFID is being increasingly 
used on the product level may lead to 
a situation where nobody can escape 
the collection of personal data via 
RFID. In this case the simplest way to 
                                                                 
Cream Cheese), while EPC contains a 
globally unique ID (e.g. Philadelphia cream 
Cheese Nr. 9388485DCo). 
15 Metro had integrated RFID tags into 
customer loyalty cards without informing 
the customers. This practice was stopped 
after the scandal had been uncovered by 
the civil rights organisation FoeBuD und 
Katherine Albrecht from the organisation 
CASPIAN, because Metro feared that 
negative publicity would continue to harm 
its image (FoeBud 2004). 
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protect oneself by not participating 
would no longer be an option. 
So far there are no serious protection 
measures from the technical point of 
view. Although customers in the Metro 
Future Store's pilot projects are offered 
the possibility to deactivate the tags, 
they cannot check whether the tags 
have been completely deactivated or 
whether they have only been rendered 
temporarily inoperable and can be 
activated again at a later time without 
being noticed (FoeBuD 2004). A further 
protection means propagated by the 
industry is the use of "blocker tags". 
They behave like transponders and 
disrupt transmission. However, they 
cannot be looked upon as reliable as 
the closeness to the reader is mostly 
accidental. Neither the reliability, nor 
whether it functions correctly, can be 
controlled (cf. Oertel et al. 2004: 53; 
CASPIAN et al. 2003). The removal of a 
tag from a product cannot be rated as 
an acceptable solution as well as 
consumers might thus exclude them-
selves from services or even be sus-
pected of theft or forgery. Presently the 
only reliable method to prevent data 
transmission between tag and reader 
is to keep the tag wrapped in alumin-
ium foil (Langheinrich 2004: 24). But 
this is not an acceptable and long-
lasting solution by which consumers 
can be protected. Critics of the present 
situation are therefore primarily con-
cerned with the fact that producers 
and traders simply shift the responsi-
bility to customers who themselves 
have to pay attention not to suffer 
from disadvantages (Langheinrich 
2004: 29; CASPIAN et al. 2003). 
Another way to solve the problem 
could be found by the introduction of 
new laws. Although data protection 
acts on a national and European level 
exist, there are concerns that it will 
become more and more difficult to 
control and maintain them because 
data processing technologies are 
getting increasingly complex and 
miniaturised (Oertel et al. 2004: 109). 
As we have already seen, the use of 
RFID might result in conflicts with 
present data protection regulations 
(Laschet/Brisch 2005: 84). The authors 
of the study on the "Modernisierung 
des bundesdeutschen Datenschutzge-
setzes", commissioned by the German 
Ministry of the Interior, conclude that 
the data protection law is by no means 
prepared for the development of omni-
present data processing (Roßnagel et 
al. 2001). Therefore existing deficien-
cies in the laws are to be found and 
new laws must be created, which are 
especially suited to the use of RFID. 
While this has not been realised by 
many politicians (FoeBud 2005), today 
the first attempts are (being) made.16 
Comparison with other technologies 
To assess the effects of RFID on the 
informational private sphere RFID 
ought to be studied in the context of 
similar technologies. There are huge 
differences in the experts' evaluation of 
the situation. It ranges from the opin-
ion that the new systems do not really 
offer anything that has not been possi-
ble so far, to the concern that tracking 
via RFID implies a new quality of 
surveillance (Oertel et al. 2004: 55). 
There are already numerous possibili-
ties to collect data or observe private 
persons via the internet, surveillance 
cameras, the storage of telephone calls 
or the use of credit or payback cards to 
name but a few. It is already widely 
known that especially the internet can 
be used for the purpose of data-mining 
(cf. Reischl 2001). Moreover it is com-
mon practice today to sell personal 
data to third parties (Leuthardt 1996: 
146). In all these cases data can be 
collected without being noticed by the 
user and the actual purpose can rarely 
be checked. 
                                                       
16 There are examples on the EU-level (cf.  
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
2005) as well as in the Federal Republic: 
The Ministry for Consumer Protection held 
a conference on "Verbraucherpolitik in der 
digitalen Welt. Der gläserne Kunde", where 
RFID was directly dealt with (cf. FoeBud 
2005). 
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Likewise the definite aim of numerous 
projects is the tracking of individuals 
(Reischl 2001: 175). Many suppliers of 
mobile phones and radio networks 
offer the localisation of mobile phones 
and their owners as standard equip-
ment that goes with Location Based 
Services (Reischl 2001: 173). The 
Global Positioning System (GPS) which 
is used in navigation systems can 
locate objects even more exactly. 
Therefore it has to be emphasised that 
the private sphere can also be violated 
in similar ways by other technologies. 
Yet RFID is different from some of the 
other technologies because of "always 
being on", which means that there is 
no possibility to switch it off voluntar-
ily. 
3.2 The discussion about a possible 
emergence of a surveillance state 
RFID like no other technology of 
Ubiquitous Computing17 has led to 
concerns about surveillance in the 
population (Langheinrich 2004). In the 
following chapter the questions if and 
how RFID can be used for governmen-
tal surveillance and which role surveil-
lance plays in a democratic society will 
be dealt with, as well as the issues of 
how on the one hand the government, 
on the other hand the population cope 
with it and which consequences may 
result from it. 
Surveillance in western democracies 
Due to certain specific qualities RFID 
can be used to observe individuals. But 
the adoption of RFID does not neces-
sarily lead to surveillance. However, 
the informational infrastructure pro-
vided by RFID can generally create the 
                                                       
17 Ubiquitous Computing describes the 
omnipresence of digital data processing 
and can be understood as the enhance-
ment of the Internet Era. It contains the 
possibility to retrieve data anywhere at any 
time (Mattern 2001). Mark Weiser is looked 
upon as father of the Ubiquitous Comput-
ing theory. He decisively determined this 
term in his essay from 1991 (cf. Weiser 
1991). 
demand for further interpretation, and, 
consequently, for surveillance also by 
the government (Rössler 2001: 226; 
Oertel et al. 2004: 47). 
Foucault (1976) analyses Bentham's 
principle of the panoptic and transfers 
it metaphorically to the disciplinary 
techniques of modern society. Fou-
cault understands the principle of the 
panoptic as an important organisa-
tional principle of western liberal 
societies. The permanent possibility of 
surveillance hereby causes the indi-
viduals to discipline themselves almost 
without the need for any social con-
trol. Deleuze further develops Fou-
cault's idea of the disciplinary society 
in his theory on the controlling society 
(Deleuze 1993: 255). While surveillance 
techniques in Foucault's sense are 
linked with institutions, Deleuze 
emphasises the penetration of society 
with flexible and permanent control 
and surveillance techniques. He sees 
the basis for the change in the means, 
i.e. in new forms of communication 
and surveillance techniques (Deleuze 
1990: 259). From today's point of view 
RFID can be regarded as such a tech-
nique in many ways. 
Mass media often deal with surveil-
lance only in connection with totalitar-
ian regimes. This leads to the impres-
sion that surveillance necessarily leads 
to a totalitarian regime, i.e. that only 
this kind of regime would use it. But 
surveillance is not absolutely negative 
and does not only exist in totalitarian 
regimes. It may have very different 
effects in different kinds of cultural 
contexts with different value systems 
(cf. Lyon 2001: 26). For example, it can 
also serve the protection of individuals 
and groups, as well as the safeguard-
ing of liberty, equality and social 
justice. Moreover it is indispensable 
for the protection of the democratic 
constitutional laws (cf. Lyon 2001: 31). 
But the abuse of surveillance by the 
government can never be excluded. 
Abuse occurs, if the government uses 
its power inadequately and does not 
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act in the interest of the majority of the 
population, or violates civil liberties. 
This would be the case if data were 
collected and used for controlling 
purposes secretly or against a person's 
free decision (cf. Rössler 2001: 226). 
Selection processes which are based 
on the scientific interpretation of data 
and which may result in the discrimi-
nation of entire groups of the popula-
tion constitute another significant 
problem (cf. Peissl 2003: 13). Schulzki-
Haddouti (2004: 170) mentions the 
example of the discrimination against 
religious minorities, for example after 
the terrorist attack of September 11, 
2001 in the United States, which was 
caused by indistinctly defined com-
puter search. This process is also 
called social sorting (Lyon quoted in 
Mattern 2003: 25). The protection of 
the population from crime and the 
protection of privacy both require a 
careful act of balancing. Furthermore, 
to which extent the preventive collec-
tion of data is regarded legitimate, also 
depends on the subjective impression 
of a threat posed by criminal attacks 
on the one hand or a violation of 
constitutional rights by the govern-
ment on the other hand. 
In the last few decades a gradual 
reversion of attitude towards law and 
order could be noticed. The original 
presumption of innocence has 
changed more and more into a general 
presumption of guilt (Leuthardt 1996: 
110). This change of the searching 
principle can be realised when looking 
at the change of legal regulations in 
the last few years. While formerly 
unlawful behaviour had to precede the 
search, today preventive observation is 
commonly established in law (cf. 
Leuthardt 1996: 109). The most recent 
trend is the adoption of profiling 
methods. Therefore one might suppose 
that the data aggregation caused by 
RFID will also attract the government's 
attention.18 
                                                       
18 This is exemplified by the latest legal 
changes, for example the abolition of 
Citizens and surveillance 
Citizens have become used to surveil-
lance and do not reflect it very criti-
cally anymore, an attitude which might 
become dangerous. Especially the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 have raised awareness about 
issues of national security. For many 
people the individual's need for secu-
rity seems to outweigh the interest in 
the protection of privacy. Therefore 
Greiner (2005) considers the popula-
tion's need for security to be the actual 
"enemy of freedom". On the other hand 
many citizens are aware of surveillance 
but do not feel disturbed or restricted 
in their privacy (cf. Winsemann 2005). 
The wide-spread acceptance of surveil-
lance leads some authors to speak of a 
"nothing to hide mentality" (cf. Winse-
mann 2005).19 This behaviour can 
obviously be attributed to the common 
concern to arouse suspicion by refus-
ing observation measures. Jutta Lim-
bach, former president of the German 
Constitutional Court, is worried that 
people will lose the pleasure of ex-
pressing their different opinions and 
committing themselves, if the govern-
ment electronically observes its citi-
zens in all domains of life (cf. Schul-
zki-Haddouti 2004: 159). Whether the 
                                                                 
confidentiality in banking in Germany on 
April 1, 2005 (Kaiser 2005), the demand for 
a prolongation of storage time for tele-
phone data to three years by the German 
Minister of the Interior Otto Schily (cf. 
Deutschlandradio 2005), the demand for an 
extension of DNA analyses and the setting 
up of a nationwide gene database (cf. WDR 
2005), or the decision of April 12, 2005, 
which permits police and public prosecu-
tors to profile and track individuals via GPS 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2005). 
19 Winsemann mentions as examples the 
widespread use of pay-back cards in spite 
of public information campaigns, web cams 
in discotheques and pubs or a chip im-
planted into the upper arm as a method of 
payment. She comes to the conclusion that 
these measures are rather looked upon as 
"fashionable accessories" and that the 
consequences concerning data protection 
and privacy are ignored (cf. Winsemann 
2005). 
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individual citizens consider the pur-
pose of observation to be legitimate 
(positive observation) or a restriction 
on their civil rights or even a threat 
(negative observation) depends on their 
respective threat assessment. 
Historical context: Technologies and 
fears of surveillance  
The debate about RFID and surveil-
lance should be seen in historical 
context. Since the 1980s there has 
been a debate about fears of surveil-
lance in context with technological 
development (Lyon 2001: 31). 
Leuthardt examines the historic devel-
opment of surveillance methods and 
fears in correlation with electronic 
data processing strategies. He shows 
that from the first databases to the 
development of chip cards to the 
introduction of the internet the possi-
bilities of data aggregation and inter-
pretation have been continually im-
proved and therefore also have been 
accompanied by fears of surveillance 
(Leuthardt 1996). During the last 
decades slogans like "electronic pan-
optic" or the "transparent citizen" or 
the "transparent society" were coined 
which also re-appear in today's de-
bates. We already leave electronic data 
tracks permanently which can be used 
for observation and controlling pur-
poses by interested parties (cf. 
Leuthardt 1996: 129). Therefore the 
question if RFID leads to a surveillance 
state is obsolete. More important is the 
question whether RFID and its embed-
ding into a network of existing surveil-
lance technologies will cause a new 
quality of surveillance. But this ques-
tion could not be answered clearly so 
far. 
3.3 RFID and consumer goods 
Products equipped with RFID tags can, 
to a certain degree, be called "smart", 
because they offer the use of further 
functions and because there are proc-
esses which can be automated.20 
Especially in networks with other 
technologies RFID-"smart" objects can 
trigger far reaching changes in every-
day life which have been hardly issued 
in the public media so far. 
Dynamic pricing 
The existence of highly automated 
networks of RFID equipped devices 
can lead to an economy in which the 
information about the "location and 
quality of goods, the means of produc-
tion and people is available in real 
time and unprecedented accuracy" – a 
"now-economy" (Müller et al. 2003: 
172).21 This might result in an ap-
proximation to the so-called "perfect 
market" (ibid.). Besides, the pricing 
system can be controlled in a highly 
dynamic way in real time on the basis 
of analysis in supply and demand 
(Bohn et al. 2003: 212-213). In practice 
this could involve an automatic change 
of a product's price at very short inter-
vals. This kind of pricing might mean 
in turn that the predictability of prices 
becomes more difficult or even gets 
impossible for customers who might 
become confused. Moreover, the 
question arises whether this model is 
fair. Will a dynamic pricing system 
discriminate against certain groups of 
consumers, maybe because their 
working hours do not allow them to go 
shopping at a favourable time? Or is it 
more likely that the shelves will always 
be refilled according to demand with-
out the need for higher prices? Even 
                                                       
20 "Smart" has become an in-term and is 
therefore insufficient for a clear definition 
of the qualities implied (von Locquenghien 
2005: 4-10). In this paper "smart" only 
refers to the limited technical qualities and 
possibilities of RFID unless else specified.  
21 Three qualities identify a "perfect market" 
in the classic micro-economic theory: 1. 
the exchangeability of goods, 2. the com-
plete overview of all market participants 
over the latest information and procedures 
and 3. the abolition of temporal or physical 
advantages for certain competitors. With 
this explanation Bohn et al. refer to David 
Krep's "A course in microeconomic theory" 
(cf. Bohn et al. 2003: 213). 
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today dynamic pricing models are used 
in other branches. Bohn et al. mention 
for example the hotel prices at the time 
of a fair, ski passes in the high season 
or on weekends, flight prices and 
internet auctions (2003: 213). But the 
acceptance of these examples cannot 
automatically be assumed for other 
products, as these mentioned goods 
could be considered luxury goods, 
which are dispensable if necessary. 
Basic food does not allow this option, 
however. 
It has already been explained that 
prices can be established individually  
on the basis of customers’ profiles. 
Here as well the question arises as to 
how far social inequalities might be 
strengthened or more justice can be 
created. In this case the retailers’ 
attitude would be crucial. 
Silent commerce 
Objects which "purchase" certain 
things themselves because of their 
context sensitivity are called "autono-
mous purchasing objects" (Bohn et al. 
2003: 216). A frequently cited example 
is the fridge that checks its contents 
and takes care of the refill according to 
the consumption behaviour of its 
owner. The term used for this proce-
dure is "silent commerce" (ibid.). It 
shows that things happen in the back-
ground without a person directly being 
involved in the decision-making proc-
ess. While on the one hand this pas-
sive way of shopping can be very 
comfortable, it might also lead to a 
feeling of loss of control. To avoid this 
danger, the procedures should be 
made as transparent and comprehen-
sible for the user as possible. Another 
problem is the accountability issue. 
What happens if the fridge has ordered 
the wrong product? Who is responsible 
for the damage? There are fears that 
"the reasons for the damage which is 
done because components from com-
puter hardware, programmes and 
network data working in combination 
can usually not be cleared up, because 
the complexity of these systems can-
not be controlled, neither from a 
mathematical nor a legal point of view" 
(cf. Behrendt/Hilty/Erdmann 2003: 20-
21). This is a basic problem of partly 
autonomous systems. However, con-
sidering the fact that up to now there 
are hardly any autonomous purchasing 
objects in private use, I consider 
exaggerated fears of this kind of risks 
to be wrong. The factors mentioned 
can still be taken into account when 
these products are designed and there 
is a realistic chance that most of them 
can be regulated by the functioning 
market itself. 
Pay-per-use business models 
Bohn et al. consider an extension of 
the pay-per-use business model onto 
all kinds of everyday objects possible 
via objects which would be uniquely 
identifiable and equipped with the 
latest communication technology 
(2003: 217). Thus the producer of a 
sofa might automatically get a transfer 
of a few cents when it is used., i.e. 
when sensors coupled with RFID tags 
and wireless internet connection 
would report this. Bohn et al. mention 
different examples of already working 
pay-per-use business models, e.g. 
charges for telephone, electric current 
and water as well as public transport 
and television. Before every use a 
conscious decision concerning the 
financial consequences is necessary. 
While one might assume on the one 
hand that this leads to stress as these 
decisions about the use of everyday 
objects would have to be made very 
frequently, one has to keep in mind on 
the other hand that the conscious 
decision making concerning the con-
sumption of electric current or water 
has also been shifted to the back-
ground. But simultaneously this exam-
ple shows that the charges arising can 
hardly be checked afterwards. This 
could become a problem with everyday 
objects and increases the possibilities 
of abuse. Users might fall into a debt 
trap, a development which could be 
observed when mobile phones were 
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introduced on a large scale (cf. Schufa 
2004: 172). Yet there is proof that the 
increase of information and the fact 
that people got used to the terms of 
payment resulted in a decrease of 
debts (ibid.). It might be possible that 
the wide-spread use of these terms of 
payment for everyday objects would 
also lead to this effect. Besides, the 
social consequences would be inter-
esting: Will fewer guests be invited if 
each use of the sofa is charged? Will 
other seating habits be developed? Will 
this lead to a change in the cultural 
significance of property? 
Specified services 
If RFID tags are embedded into ob-
jects, it is possible to assign all the 
single parts of a machine to a pro-
ducer. It is conceivable that a function 
could be incorporated into machines 
which would prevent spare parts from 
another firm being put in. This would 
severely restrict the free choice of 
spare parts and it would imply the 
exclusion of certain services for cus-
tomers with lower incomes. This 
principle can also be transferred to 
other services like maintenance and 
repair. It is questionable, however, if 
companies would be interested in such 
a function at all, as they would risk a 
damage to their image if customers did 
not accept the principle. On the other 
hand the question would have to be 
studied whether the use of the pre-
scribed parts would even increase the 
safety of the product significantly and 
thus bring about an advantage for the 
user. 
Dynamic and personalised insurance 
models 
Insurances might also be interested in 
personalised data which reflects the 
everyday behaviour of individuals 
(Bohn et al. 2003: 218). RFID and 
sensor containing objects can be able 
to record the individual consumption 
and behavioural habits of their own-
ers, to transmit these to insurances 
that in turn could offer dynamic and 
highly personalised insurance bo-
nuses. The smart refrigerator could 
transfer information about eating 
habits, the sensor-equipped car would 
be able to transmit detailed data about 
the driving habits of its owner to the 
insurance (cf. Langheinrich 2005). 
However, the question must be raised, 
if these data produce a true picture of 
reality and if this could lead to a fairer 
billing system. In general, problems 
could arise comparable to those in the 
previous examples concerning verifi-
ability, abuse and financial calcula-
bility. Yet a positive effect based on 
individually measurable data could be 
an increased awareness for issues of 
health and risk in the population. 
Digitally upgraded everyday objects 
By means of RFID every object can be 
assigned specific information. This 
information can be retrieved automati-
cally via the internet and transmitted 
by different media. So far mainly 
producers and operators can make use 
of data storage on the object, but in 
the future consumers might also reap 
the benefits. These could be operating 
instructions for electronic devices, 
recipes for cooking, information about 
the ingredients of food, instructions 
for care and maintenance, guarantee 
information, advertisements, bonus 
features or personal comments which 
can be scanned by privately owned 
readers. Presumably the additional 
digital features will increasingly influ-
ence the assessment of products' 
qualities. 
"What is displayed in every single case, 
may depend on the context, i.e. on the 
question whether the consumer is a 
long-time customer and has paid a lot 
for the product, whether he is over 18, 
which language he speaks, or his 
present whereabouts – maybe even on 
the question whether he belongs to the 
right party." (Mattern 2003: 9) 
Mattern's statement shows that the 
information can be offered in a very 
flexible and personalised way, but at 
the same time he refers to the risks 
involved. He also raises the question of 
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who determines the contents of the 
object's statement, and who guaran-
tees their objectivity and accuracy 
(Mattern 2003: 11). An objection would 
be that the contents of every mass 
media, e.g. television or internet, can 
be ideologically prejudiced just as well 
and in a certain respect are always 
shaped by subjective interests. Like-
wise the accuracy of information can 
rarely be completely guaranteed and 
proved. In this sense RFID containing 
objects are simply a new medium 
which will be affected by an already 
existing problem. Besides, this issue of 
acceptance of digitally upgraded 
objects will also depend on the influ-
ence a customer can exercise on the 
display of the data. An advertising film 
constantly showing on a display of the 
refrigerator would most likely be 
disapproved of, yet occasional re-
quested information on a certain 
product might be welcomed. 
3.4 RFID's influence on health and 
environment 
Consequences for health and environ-
ment must also be considered a factor 
influencing everyday life. Little re-
search has yet been done in this field. 
Generally speaking, 
"the influence on environmental as-
pects like disposal, consumption of 
resources and energy by a large scale 
implementation of ubiquitous comput-
ing technologies […] is hardly predict-
able, especially because a change of 
lifestyles, more dynamic economic 
circles and new consumer habits as a 
consequence of the new technology will 
react upon these parameters" (Bohn et 
al. 2003: 231). 
With good reason this statement can 
be transferred to RFID, as it is looked 
upon as one of the key technologies of 
ubiquitous computing. 
Electromagnetic radiation 
RFID being a radio technology is 
connected with electromagnetic radia-
tion when operated. Health risks 
caused by radiation have been re-
searched and debated in public so far 
only with reference to mobile phones 
and their effects. RFID's radiation 
effects on health have not been clari-
fied as yet and long term effects in 
particular have not yet been re-
searched (cf. Hilty et al. 2003: 240). 
Furthermore it is well-known that the 
distance between the source of radia-
tion and the body has a strong influ-
ence on the intensity of the exposition. 
Future applications like the integration 
of RFID tags into clothes or their 
implantation into the human body may 
therefore raise the level of exposition 
to radiation. Advocates of RFID object 
that the radiation of RFID is lower than 
that of mobile phones and that it is not 
always active but only "on call", and 
therefore not or significantly less 
dangerous (cf. Cisco 2004). However, 
in workplaces where RFID systems are 
constantly in use, the radiation might 
have a much more negative effect than 
expected. This demonstrates the 
"urgent need for research" 
(Behrendt/Hilty/Erdmann 2003: 18). 
Implantation of transponders 
Medically, the implantation of RFID 
tags into a human body is already 
feasible, but it is not widespread yet. 
There are no accurate research results 
concerning harmful effects of RFID 
tags implanted into the body. First 
concepts for medical applications of 
RFID are now being developed, for 
example the implantation of a sensor 
and transponder to permanently 
measure and monitor the intraocular 
pressure of patients with glaucoma 
permanently (cf. IMS 2005). For 
chronically ill people, the monitoring 
of different physiologic parameters 
could mean a higher degree of safety 
and a better quality of life. Moreover, 
an implanted RFID chip could incorpo-
rate personal medical information, 
which might be life-saving especially in 
cases of emergency. However, there is 
a critical objection that the implanted 
medical information could create a 
problem concerning data protection 
laws. For chronically ill people the 
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advantages might outweigh the disad-
vantages, for many others, however, 
the dangers would be considerably 
higher than the advantages. Further-
more it has to be dealt with the issue 
that the implantation of RFID tags 
might lead to negative psychological 
consequences.22 What does a person 
feel about an implanted and simulta-
neously linked tag which sends data 
from inside the body: would it be 
perceived as a prosthesis, as a foreign 
body, as an unwanted intruder or 
traitor? Or even as a fashionable 
accessory as can be seen in the case of 
the Baja Beach Club? The question if 
RFID tags are implanted voluntarily, is  
definitely one of the most crucial 
issues for their acceptance. 
Health management 
A tag on food and medicine containing 
detailed information on the product 
may help to promote applications 
which compare the ingredients auto-
matically with individual incompatibili-
ties and give warning signals in case of 
danger. Besides, a check could be kept 
on the correct taking of medicine. The 
first prototypes of smart medical 
cupboards reminding users of taking 
their medicine or informing them 
about medicine that expired have 
already been developed (cf. IMS 2003). 
Yet it has to be criticised that the 
devices for dispensing them are diffi-
cult to operate for the intended target 
group, i.e. mainly senior citizens. The 
interface would have to be improved 
and become better suited to the target 
groups. 
The genuineness of medicines 
The pharmaceutical industry in the 
United States plans to integrate RFID 
tags into the packaging of medicine in 
order to document their genuineness 
and location because many products 
are forged (cf. Computerwoche 2004). 
                                                       
22 Paul Virilio (1999) extensively considers 
the relationship between technology and 
the body, yet without giving attention to a 
special technology (also see Misoch 2005). 
This could mean a higher security 
standard for patients as fakes can be 
distinguished from originals, if pa-
tients get the possibility to scan the 
tags. But the question remains if the 
problem of fakes will not simply be 
transferred. If criminals for example 
used empty original packaging and 
filled it with forged products then the 
possibility to distinguish this medicia-
tion from originals would be consid-
erably lower. The problem could only 
be solved by killing the tags after the 
consumption of the medicine. But this 
is technically not yet possible and it 
would probably not be easily imple-
mented. 
Stress 
RFID has the potential to reduce stress 
in everyday life. Automated admission 
control might shorten waiting queues 
for example. If people were reminded 
of their everyday tasks they might 
carry them out more reliably. But, 
depending on the use of the technol-
ogy, this might also lead to negative 
stimulus satiation (cf. Hilty et al. 2003: 
245). It has to be emphasised that even 
the uncertainty of potential risks might 
result in a physical health risk. The 
feeling of being threatened can for 
example lead to insomnia, and corre-
spondingly involve health problems 
(ibid.: 238). This feeling may be caused 
by fears of radiation, surveillance or of 
losing control likewise. 
Electronic waste 
During my research I did not find any 
plans for the disposal of RFID elec-
tronics. Today RFID applications are 
mainly confined to closed systems. 
"Disposable labels" in the form of 
smart labels on products at retail for 
example are not widely in use. 
"If smart labels were affixed to all 
supermarket products in the future, 
then billions of these chips would get 
into the household waste. Although a 
single chip weighs far less than a gram 
the total sum of all these chips would 
add up to several thousands of tons of 
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electronic waste." (Bohn et al. 2003: 
231) 
Separate disposal could become a 
problem because tags can be inte-
grated into packaging materials. On 
the other hand, RFID offers the possi-
bility to optimise recycling processes 
because waste materials could be 
identified and separated more effi-
ciently with the help of the data stored 
(ibid.). This might simplify waste 
disposal for the individual as machines 
could do the separating automatically. 
But up to today this concept cannot be 
technically realised yet. 
Monitoring of the environment 
In the future tiny sensors and RFID 
equipped devices might be able to 
monitor and document environmental 
phenomena in a so far unprecedented 
way. These data collections could lead 
to a potentially new understanding of 
certain processes in nature which in 
turn could enable scientists to find out 
about environmental disasters at an 
earlier date. Accordingly early warning 
systems could be used in a more 
targeted way. In the same way infor-
mation about the populations of 
threatened species might be collected 
which could lead to new scientific 
findings. But apart from the tagging of 
animals there can hardly be found any 
applications in this sector until now 
(Oertel et al. 2004: 95). 
3.5 The relationship to RFID contain-
ing objects 
If embedded RFID tags can make 
everyday objects smart, then this can 
influence the perception of these 
objects as well as the individual's 
relationship to them. Psychologists 
and sociologists have only just gained 
interest in RFID. For a more detailed 
analysis the existing and future pilot 
projects would have to be studied 
extensively. The following chapter 
deals with the factors that might 
influence the relationship between 
man and RFID containing objects. 
 
Recognition of RFID containing objects 
It is important to know whether the 
individual can realise at all that an 
object has been changed i.e. that it 
represents more than its physical 
appearance and its conventionally 
known functions. Only then the differ-
ence in the relationship to an RFID 
containing object can be examined. 
The following factors are decisive: 
• The visibility of the technology: 
many tags which are in use today 
are so small that they can hardly be 
noticed, and are placed invisibly or 
integrated into packaging material. 
The same can be said for readers, 
as well. 
• The visibility of the reaction to the 
reading process: even if the tech-
nology itself is not visible, the reac-
tion to the reading process can be 
noticed, for example when a ski 
pass automatically releases the 
turnstile. 
• Knowledge about the use of the 
technology: this can be achieved by 
information about the use of smart 
labels on a shelf in the supermar-
ket, on the packaging of products 
or by public notice, for example. 
It can be assumed that those different 
ways of recognition will influence the 
individual realisation of the object and 
the emotional relationship to it. Yet if 
the object does not seem changed at 
all, RFID will probably neither directly 
influence the way the object is per-
ceived nor the relationship between 
man and smart objects. It would also 
be necessary to study delayed or 
indirect effects which are not in first 
place linked with the visibility of the 
change. 
Benefits of the application 
Furthermore it is important to know 
whether the new quality is seen posi-
tively or negatively. Hereby a few 
elements might be of importance:  
Kerstin von Locquenghien, RFID-"smarte" Alltagsobjekte 73 
 
 
Personal advantage:23 If the additional 
quality or function is seen as an ad-
vantage, it can be assumed that the 
object will be looked upon in a more 
positive and confident way than one 
without this technical upgrading. The 
degree of the positive realisation 
would grow accordingly if the function 
was used frequently and the positive 
result confirmed. It is different with 
applications which are complicated or 
do not function in the expected way 
and therefore lead to frustrations. The 
user might become mistrustful and 
finally see the object in a negative light 
(cf. Norman 1988: 11). 
Advantage for others: Not every appli-
cation implies a direct advantage for 
the user of the object. If a customer 
profile is created for marketing pur-
poses the subjective advantage can 
only be perceived indirectly, if at all, or 
might even be seen solely on the 
operator's side. If users don’t accept 
this kind of external benefit, they 
might feel to be at the mercy of the 
object or even feel threatened by it. 
Impression of autonomy and aliveness 
For different reasons electronically 
upgraded everyday objects are attrib-
uted the ability to act autonomously or 
being alive. On the one hand the way 
of communication about smart objects 
influences the perception of their 
qualities. In related literature human 
qualities are often used to describe so-
called smart objects. This kind of 
rhetorical description produces the 
picture of a strongly emotional and 
socially aware autonomous acting 
object, which in reality simply executes 
certain pre-programmed functions 
without any reflection (Reeves/Nass 
1996: 4). 
Apart from the descriptive attribution 
of human qualities, observable fea-
tures also contribute to the perception 
                                                       
23 Here I transfer Donald A. Norman's 
(1988) results from his psychopathologic 
study of everyday things to RFID contain-
ing everyday objects. 
and evaluation of smart objects (Ram-
mert/Schulz-Schaeffer 2002: 29). The 
impression of autonomy furthermore 
depends on the degree of context 
sensitivity and the actual autonomy of 
decision making behaviours, as has 
been briefly shown by the examples 
above. If the technological process is 
unknown, a person easily gets the 
impression that the object itself is 
"speaking" or "acting" and therefore 
appears to be "intelligent", because of 
the reaction caused by the object 
directly being attributed to the object 
itself.24 In this context Adamowsky 
speaks of a re-emerging so-called 
"magic effect" (2003: 4), which is even 
emphasised by the "invisibility" and 
complexity of technologies such as 
RFID. Turkle (2004) also deals with the 
effects of "affective computing". Espe-
cially children tend to react emotion-
ally to "intelligent" toys and clearly 
attribute to them a certain kind of 
"aliveness". More and more this effect 
can also be observed with grown-ups. 
However, the problem of grown-ups 
ascribing "aliveness" to "intelligent" 
artefacts is by no means new: it has 
already been noticed and analysed by 
Weizenbaum in the 1970s (cf. Weizen-
baum 1977). From today's perspective 
the topic becomes even more relevant 
than ever before because of the devel-
opment of new advanced technologies 
and their integration into highly com-
plex systems. 
The physical as well as the communi-
cation design can therefore be consid-
ered as one of the most influential 
factors for the relationship between 
man and RFID containing objects. 
When looking at today’s applications, 
it becomes clear that the design op-
tions for RFID containing smart ob-
jects and their communication inter-
faces are still wide open.  
                                                       
24 For a detailed analysis of technical 
artefacts and their perception as acting 
objects, I would like to refer to the paper of 
Werner Rammert and Ingo Schulz-
Schaeffer (2002) who extensively deal with 
relevant concepts.  
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A smart card implying the function of a 
key is most likely regarded as a new 
physical form of a key or a type of 
switch. The card would be looked 
upon as an instrument, which would 
not result in a closer emotional rela-
tionship (cf. Krämer 1998: 83-84). 
If the object’s physical or communica-
tion design gives the impression of 
being alive however, it would most 
likely lead to a greater emotional 
reaction of the user. 
Therefore RFID containing objects 
should first be separated into different 
categories before being analysed. As a 
result it has to be taken into account, 
that the relationship between man and 
RFID containing smart objects can 
probably neither be treated like the 
man-machine-relationship nor like the 
man-robot or the man-computer-
relationship. In these cases the func-
tion and the significance of newly 
introduced objects had been altogether 
new. Thus they could be perceived as a 
unity, and new ways of man-machine 
interaction could be acquired step-by-
step. Comparatively, RFID applications 
are expected to lead to unfamiliar 
situations because of the fact that 
everyday objects with already well-
known qualities will additionally gain 
one or more so far unknown qualities. 
 
4 Conclusion 
The consideration of potential future 
applications and their possible effects 
shows, that RFID has the power to 
bring about considerable changes. 
Apart from some chances, serious risks 
are to be expected. Today the extent of 
the changes can not yet be assessed as 
the future development of RFID tech-
nology and applications is still widely 
open.25 It is exactly this openness as 
                                                       
25 In the TA-Swiss paper on the precaution-
ary principle in the information society 
from the year 2003, this open potential for 
development is called "Januskopf chances" 
as the situation offers chances as well as 
risks (cf. Hilty et al. 2003: 265). 
well as the awareness of potential 
risks which offer the chance to the 
people to deeply influence future 
developments and to actively take part 
in this process. A generalisation of 
concerns about RFID should be 
avoided, however, because of the 
diversity of existing technical systems 
and different applications in connec-
tion with their intentions. All members 
of society likewise have to take on the 
responsibility regarding the further 
development of RFID. 
Developers: They can dictate, facilitate 
or exclude certain ways in which a 
technology can be used by creating the 
technical and organisational frame-
work. "What is technically prevented, 
does not have to be outlawed." 
(Roßnagel/Lütge 2005) as soft- and 
hardware regulate the rules in cyber-
space in a similar way as laws do in 
the real world (Lessig 1999: 6). 
Operators:26 Their attitude decisively 
determines the way RFID systems are 
deployed and how they treat those 
people who are affected by the 
applications. Operators should be 
greatly interested in maintaining the 
trust of customers and staff (cf. 
Capgemini 2005: 16). Therefore they 
should keep their specific application 
of RFID as transparent as possible and 
allow affected people to make a 
conscious decision about their 
participation as well as the option to 
permanently deactivate their tags. 
Operators should equally pass on 
some of the benefits resulting from the 
application of the RFID system (ibid.). 
The government: It is the government's 
task to mediate between the different 
interest groups in society and to inter-
vene if necessary. This includes the 
revision of existing laws in order to 
guarantee their applicability in the 
context of new technologies as well as 
                                                       
26 The term shall include everybody who 
operates an RFID system and/or uses the 
data collections produced hereby for data 
mining purposes. 
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the establishment of new laws. Hereby 
the government should apply the 
methods of technology and risk as-
sessment and include experts in their 
discussions. At the moment the im-
pression that German data protection 
officials are not taken seriously is 
alarming.27 Furthermore, globalisation 
processes lead to a legislation, which 
is tremendously under pressure due to 
international requirements or other 
internationally powerful states. Even 
though national governments often-
times have an area of discretion con-
cerning international laws, they rarely 
make use of it, but follow the general 
trend, without investing much time in 
a critical reflexion.28 The close tie 
between politics and industries also 
state a severe influence on political 
decision making. Last but not least the 
responsibility of states also implies the 
protection of the individual's rights. A 
fact which nowadays sometimes seems 
to be eclipsed. 
Citizens: They also bear part of the 
responsibility by their attitude towards 
new technological developments and 
applications, a fact which is often 
underrated. At present the population 
does not seem to be well informed 
about RFID. This might be due to a bad 
information policy on the part of the 
operators, but also due to a lack of 
                                                       
27 For example the data protection official 
of the Federal Republic, Peter Schaar, had 
criticised the Federal Government in his 
progress report published in April 2005. 
The Minister for the Interior, Otto Schily, 
countered that Schaar "had gone beyond 
his competence, and that it was not his 
task to assess technical questions and 
comment on political decisions" (DPA 
2005).  
28 A good example is the quick implementa-
tion of biometric data in passports for 
example. (cf. DPA 2005; Die Welt 2004). 
Biometric data is stored on RFID tags 
integrated into the cover of the passport. 
The functionality of RFID tags as well as 
their potential health risks have not been 
assessed yet especially in long term use. 
Additionally they have been implemented 
regardless of emerging concerns about 
privacy issues. 
interest on the part of the population. 
This attitude is alarming, because a 
passive behaviour neglects the chances 
of shaping the path of new technolo-
gies. However, this can lead to the 
dreaded imbalance in the considera-
tion of different social interests. Civil 
rights activists, for instance, have 
already proved that and how the 
population can actively exercise its 
influence through various actions.29 
"While the analysis of a technology only 
answers the question of what the future 
can bring, the question of what the 
future may bring must be answered by 
a societal process." (Mattern 2003: 29). 
Although controversies about risks and 
conflicts are often perceived as distur-
bances for society, economy and 
democracy, they should rather be seen 
as a learning process, as a productive 
element and a basis of democracy (cf. 
Petermann 2001: 7). Therefore the 
present discussion about the spreading 
of RFID should be regarded as an 
important occasion to re-negotiate the 
different interests occurring within a 
society and to discuss the fear of an 
omnipresent surveillance by the gov-
ernment. Basis for this process should 
be a balance of considering personal 
advantages as well as potential social 
costs. The democratic system is not a 
rigid structure; on the contrary it 
requires negotiation and must be 
understood as a never-ending perma-
nent re-shaping process (cf. Marchart 
2002: 296-297). Panic related to RFID 
technology, like some authors try to 
spread, is not justified at this time. 
However, they make an important 
contribution by bringing the topic to 
public attention and by taking part in 
the public debate. 
The most important issues at stake 
should be to objectify the discussion, 
to inform and involve the public, to 
abolish existing myths about the 
technical potential of RFID, to intensify 
                                                       
29 E.g. CASPIAN (www.spychips.com) or 
FoeBud e.V (www.foebud.org/rfid). 
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the interdisciplinary debate about 
potential effects of the technology as 
well as to commonly work on a stable 
societal solution. 
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